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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SCOTT EUGENE MADSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SHAUNA MARIE BULLOCK MADSEN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
No. 97-0680 CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Second Judicial District Court, 
Davis County, The Honorable Michael G. Allphin, presiding, 
District Court Case No. 96-4702009 DA, 
I. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Because this is a domestic relations matter, the Utah Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE #1. Did the trial court err by awarding Mrs. Madsen 
$550.00 per month in alimony when Mr. Madsen's expenses are such 
1 
that he does not have the ability to pay alimony? 
The standard of review for this issue involves a challenge 
to a finding of fact that will be overturned only if clearly 
erroneous. See Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (quoting Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989)). 
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court; This issue was 
presented by Mr. Madsen's counsel in his closing argument before 
the trial court on July 10, 1997, (Tr. at 172), during the 
testimony of Mr. Madsen before the trial court on July 10, 1997, 
(Tr. at 13-14), and in Plaintiffs Exhibit #1, (R. at 100). 
Marshalling of Evidence: The trial court received the 
following evidence regarding the award of alimony: 
a. At the time of trial, Mr. Madsen's gross income from his 
job at Crysen Refining, Inc., was $2,716.44 per month. (Tr. at 
11-13; R. at 100.) 
b. At the time of trial, Mr. Madsen had rental income of 
$225.00 per month. (Tr. at 13; R. at 100.) 
c. Prior to trial, Mr. Madsen had received additional 
income from work as an ice hockey and roller hockey referee, but 
had discontinued the roller hockey officiating because he had 
been assaulted by a player in the league. (Tr. at 14-15, 42-56, 
70.) 
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d. In 1994 (the parties' year of marriage), Mrs. Madsen1s 
annual income was $19,519.14, (R. at 131). At the time of trial, 
she was unsure of her income but it was between $18,000.00 per 
year, (Tr. at 84), and $22,000.00 per year, (Tr. at 144). Her 
sworn Financial Declaration asserted a gross monthly income of 
$1,840.00, or $22,080.00 annually. (R. at 92.) 
e. That Mrs. Madsen was owed child-support payments of 
$600.00 per month by her husband from a prior marriage. (Tr. at 
97-98, 145-46.) 
f. That Mrs. Madsen1s total monthly expenses were 
$2,493.00, (Tr. at 134-35; R. at 99). Mrs. Madsen's testimony 
regarding individual expense items is found at Tr. 94-117. 
g. That Mr. Madsen had been arrested for domestic violence 
on two (2) occasions, and that Mrs. Madsen believed the domestic 
violence to have contributed to the end of the marriage. (Tr. at 
135-40, 152-54.) 
h. That Mrs. Madsen believed her income to be insufficient 
to meet her needs. (Tr. at 118.) 
i. That Mrs. Madsen believed her standard of living to have 
fallen during the time that she had been separated from Mr. 
Madsen. (Tr. at 118.) Mrs. Madsen presented no evidence that she 
gave up an alimony award to marry plaintiff or that her income at 
the time of trial was less than it had ever been. 
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j. That between the time she filed for bankruptcy in 1991 
and the time she married Mr. Madsen in 1994, Mrs. Madsen 
supported herself and her three children (3) on the same salary 
she earned at the time of the divorce. (Tr. at 144-45.) 
The evidence before the trial court regarding Mr. Madsenfs 
expenses was the direct testimony of Mr. Madsen, (Tr. at 13-14), 
a reduction in the sum of $246.80, stipulated to by the parties1 
counsel, (Tr. at 75-76), and Plaintiff's Exhibit #1, (R. at 100). 
This uncontradicted evidence demonstrated that Mr. Madsen1s total 
monthly expenses were $3,048.20. Counsel for Mrs. Madsen only 
cross-examined Mr. Madsen regarding his expenses for mortgage and 
rent payments, (Tr. at 56-57), and never argued that Mr. Madsen's 
other expenses, as testified to, were inaccurate, excessive or 
otherwise inappropriate. 
The trial court received the following evidence of Mr. 
Madsen's contractual duties and obligations regarding the home: 
a. That Mr. Madsen had assumed the obligation of paying the 
$557.00 monthly payment on the home remodeling loan. (Tr. at 56.) 
b. That Mr. Madsen was obligated to pay property taxes, 
homeowner's insurance, and residential maintenance costs in the 
amount of $147.00 per month. (Tr. at 13-14; R. at 100.) 
c. That Mr. Madsen's mother, Evalyn Madsen, executed a 
Quit-Claim deed in May, 1996, which made Mr. Madsen and his 
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mother legal joint tenants of the home located at 136 East 1200 
South, Bountiful, Utah. (Tr. at 32-33; R. at 166-67.) 
d. That Mr. Madsen described the property as being his 
mother's property. (Tr. at 36.) 
e. That Mr. Madsen had his name placed upon the deed, via 
the Quit-Claim deed, in order to reflect his investment of 
$20,000.00 in proceeds received from a premarital home sale. (Tr. 
at 65-66.) 
f. That Mr. Madsen*s mother continued to pay approximately 
an additional $100.00 per month so as to accelerate a reduction 
in the principal on the home remodeling loan. (Tr. at 56-57.) 
g. That despite signing the Quit-Claim deed, Mr. Madsen's 
mother believed that she owned the property and did not intend to 
give it to Mr. Madsen until her death. (Tr. at 78-79.) 
ISSUE #2. Did the trial court err in its Conclusion of Law 
that Mrs. Madsen was entitled to alimony for thirty-five (35) 
months without making any findings of fact as to the basis for an 
award for that duration? 
This issue is solely a question of law, with no deference to 
be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Ramirezf 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 
1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
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Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court: This issue was 
presented by Mr. Madsen's counsel in his closing argument before 
the trial court on July 10, 1997. (Tr. at 165.) 
Marshalling of Evidence: Where the trial court's findings 
are insufficiently detailed to allow for meaningful review7, an 
appellant is not required to engage in a futile marshalling 
exercise. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). No evidence was presented to the trial 
court to support or justify the duration of the alimony awarded 
by the trial court beyond the length of the marriage. 
ISSUE #3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
failing to consider restoring each party to their respective 
premarital circumstances, as provided in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-
5(7)(f) (Supp. 1997)? 
The standard of review for this issue is one that the Court 
will grant the trial court's decision some deference, reviewing 
it for an abuse of discretion. See Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 
96, 100 (Utah 1986); Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 546 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court: This issue was 
presented by Mr. Madsen's counsel in his closing argument before 
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the trial court on July 10, 1997, (Tr. at 163, 164-65, 172), and 
in Mr. Madsen's Trial Brief, submitted to the trial court on July 
9, 1997, (R. at 83-84) . 
Marshalling of Evidence: The trial court received the 
following evidence regarding the parties' premarital 
circumstances: 
a. Between 1991 and 1994, Mrs. Madsen supported herself and 
her three (3) children on approximately the same salary she was 
earning at the time of this divorce. (Tr. at 144-45.) 
b. The parties' income during this marriage, and prior to 
separation, was as follows: 
Party 1994 1995 1996 
Mr. Madsen $49,706.78 $49,509.50 $53,370.99 
Mrs. Madsen $19,865.15 $17,103.45 $18,814.30 
(R. at 120.) 
c. That Mrs. Madsen believed her standard of living to have 
fallen during the time that she had been separated from Mr. 
Madsen. (Tr. at 118.) Mrs. Madsen presented no evidence that she 
gave up an alimony award to marry plaintiff or that her income at 
the time of trial was less than it had ever been. 
ISSUE #4. Did the trial court use "fault" in awarding 
alimony so as to punish Mr. Madsen? 
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This issue is solely a question of law, with no deference to 
be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 
1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court: This issue was 
presented by Mr. Madsen's counsel in his closing argument before 
the trial court on July 10, 1997. (Tr. at 172.) 
ISSUE #5. Did the trial court err by simply awarding 
alimony for the duration of the marriage without making any 
findings to support the duration of the alimony award? 
This issue is solely a question of law, with no deference to 
be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 
1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court; This issue was 
presented by Mr. Madsenfs counsel in his closing argument before 
the trial court on July 10, 1997, (Tr. at 162), and in Mr. 
Madsen's Trial Brief, submitted to the trial court on July 9, 
1997, (R. at 84-85). 
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ISSUE #6. Did the trial court err in awarding $2,000.00 in 
attorney's fees to Mrs. Madsen when the trial court did not 
analyze the reasonableness of the fees and no evidence was 
presented to support that award? 
This issue is solely a question of law, with no deference to 
be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 
1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court: This issue was 
presented by Mr. Madsen's counsel in his closing argument before 
the trial court on July 10, 1997. (Tr. at 169, 173.) 
Marshalling of Evidence: The trial court received the 
following evidence regarding Mrs. Madsen's attorney's fees: 
a. Mrs. Madsen's testimony that she owed fees and was 
unable to pay them. (Tr. at 151.) 
b. Mr. Nielson's assertion that an affidavit of attorney's 
fees had been prepared, although no such affidavit was made part 
of the record and apparently was not submitted to the trial 
court. (Tr. at 169-70.) 
c. Mr. Nielson's proffer that the amount of attorney's fees 
was roughly $3,900.00, representing nearly twenty-five (25) hours 
of work. (Tr. at 170.) 
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ISSUE #7. Did the trial court err in assessing legal fees 
against Mr. Madsen on the basis of his legal interest in real 
property when it also found that Mr. Madsen's monthly expenses 
could be reduced because his mother owned the real property? 
This issue is solely a question of law, with no deference to 
be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 
1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court; This issue was 
presented during the testimony of Mr. Madsen before the trial 
court on July 10, 1997, (Tr. at 13-14), and in Plaintiff's 
Exhibit #1, (R. at 100). 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Interpretation of the following statutory provisions will be 
determinative of the outcome of this case. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (Supp. 1997) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(b) (Supp. 1997) 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(c) (Supp. 1997) 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(f) (Supp. 1997) 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1997) 
Complete verbatim copies of the foregoing statutory 
provisions are set forth in the Addendum submitted herewith. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This is an appeal from the Second District Court's decision 
in a divorce proceeding following a short-term marriage. Mr. 
Madsen filed a Complaint for divorce on December 17, 1996, 
twenty-nine months and one day after the parties were married. 
The Court issued its Minute Entry requiring Mr. Madsen to pay 
temporary alimony in the amount of $250.00 per month on April 21, 
1997. Trial was held before the Honorable Michael G. Allphin on 
July 10, 1997. Judge Allphin signed the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce on October 28, 1997, 
wherein 
1. Mr. Madsen was awarded the Decree 
of Divorce on the ground of 
irreconcilable differences; 
2. Mr. Madsen was ordered to pay alimony to Mrs. 
Madsen in the amount of $550.00 per month for 35 
months, and 
3. Mr. Madsen was ordered to pay Mrs. Madsen's 
attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000.00. 
Mr. Madsen timely filed this Notice of Appeal on November 
21, 1997. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Madsen and Defendant/Appellee Shauna M. Madsen were 
11 
married on or about July 16, 1994. (Tr. at 9.) 
2. During the marriage, the parties and their children 
lived in the home owned by Mr. Madsen1s mother prior to the 
marriage. (Tr. at 24-25.) The home is located at 136 East 1200 
South, Bountiful, Utah. (Id.) 
3. On May 16, 1996, a Quit-Claim deed was executed by Mr. 
Madsenfs mother that made Mr. Madsen and his mother legal joint 
tenants of the home. (Tr. at 32-33; R. at 166-67.) Mr. Madsen 
also co-signed on a mortgage obligation incurred with Fleet 
Mortgage in order that an apartment could be built for his mother 
in the residence. (Tr. at 26-27; R. at 164, 168-175.) Mr. 
Madsen1s interest in the home was his own separate property. (R. 
at 193.) By virtue of the Trust Deed with Fleet Mortgage, Mr. 
Madsen was obligated to make payments of $557.00 for the mortgage 
obligation, $72.00 for real property taxes, $25.00 for real 
property insurance, and $50.00 for home maintenance, lawn care, 
and repairs. (Tr. at 13- 14; R. at 100, 168-175.) 
4. In March, 1995, Mr. Madsen was arrested for domestic 
violence and pled no contest to the charges (Tr. at 138-39, 153-
54. ) 
5. In November, 1996, there was a physical confrontation 
involving Mr. Madsen, Mrs. Madsen, and the sons of Mrs. Madsen. 
(Tr. at 136-38.) Mr. Madsen was arrested for domestic violence 
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and pled guilty to assault. (Tr. at 152-53.) 
6. In early December, 1996, the parties separated. (Tr. at 
136.) Mr. Madsen subsequently filed a Complaint for divorce. (R. 
at 1-5.) Mrs. Madsen filed an Answer to Mr. Madsen1s Complaint 
in which she admitted to irreconcilable differences as grounds 
for divorce. (R. at 9.) Mrs. Madsen also sought alimony "based 
upon the earning capacities and relative needs of the parties." 
(IcL.) 
7. The parties1 respective incomes during the marriage, and 
prior to separation, were as follows: 
Party 1994 1995 1996 
Mr. Madsen $49,706.78 $49,509.50 $53f370.99 
Mrs. Madsen $19,865.15 $17,103.45 $18,814.30 
(R. at 120.) 
8. Trial was held before Judge Michael G. Allphin of the 
Second District Court on July 10, 1997. (R. at 191.) 
9. Judge Allphin signed the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on October 28, 1997. (R. at 200.) 
10. Judge Allphin signed the Decree of Divorce on October 
28, 1997. (R. at 203.) 
11. Mr. Madsen timely filed his Notice of Appeal on 
November 21, 1997. (R. at 206.) 
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VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial judge erred in finding that Mr. Madsen has the 
ability to pay alimony. Mr. Madsen1s undisputed and unchallenged 
monthly expenses are only $13.00 less than his net monthly 
income. By reducing, sua sponte, Mr. Madsen*s monthly expenses 
in the sum of $542.00, the trial judge improperly awarded alimony 
in the sum of $550.00 per month. 
The trial judge also improperly used Mr. Madsen1s "fault" 
(i.e., two (2) incidents of domestic violence) to punish Mr. 
Madsen by awarding alimony that he cannot afford to pay. 
Further, the trail judge offered no analysis or explanation for 
awarding alimony for thirty-five (35) months beyond the fact that 
the marriage lasted thirty-five (35) months. 
Finally, the trial judge did not have sufficient evidence 
before him to justify the attorney's fees awarded in this case. 
The trial judge also failed to analyze the factors set forth in 
caselaw that are necessary to justify an award of attorney's 
fees. 
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VII. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING MR. MADSEN 
HAS THE ABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY. 
A. 
The Undisputed Evidence Demonstrated that Mr. 
Madsen's Automobile, Utility, Telephone, and 
Food and Household Expenses Were $395 Higher 
than the Amount Found by the Court 
Mr. Madsen testified that Plaintiffs Exhibit #1, (R. at 
100), accurately reflected the following monthly expenses: 
Food and Household Supplies $450.00 
Utilities 200.00 
Telephone 125.00 
Auto Expenses 250.00 
Those expenses were never questioned by Mrs. Madsen's counsel, 
nor was it ever argued those expenses were unreasonable in 
closing argument. In its Findings of Fact, however, the trial 
court, sua sponte and without explanation, determined that it 
would consider Mr. Madsen's expenses as follows: 
Food and Household Supplies $350.00 (-$100.00) 
Utilities 100.00 (-$100.00) 
Telephone 30.00 (-$ 95.00) 
Auto Expenses 150.00 (-$100.00) 
TOTAL NET DIFFERENCE -$395.00 
Where there is disputed evidence about expenses, it is clearly 
within the trial court's authority to "accept, modify, reduce, or 
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reject" a party's claimed expenses. Willey v. Willey, 333 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 8, 11 (Utah 1997). Here, however, the evidence was 
undisputed and unchallenged. Accordingly, the trial court's 
Findings of Fact, insofar as they reduced Mr. Madsen's undisputed 
and unchallenged expenses, are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, 
based on the record, this Court is obligated to order the trial 
court to reduce the alimony award by $395.00 per month so as to 
properly reflect Mr. Madsen's ability to pay alimony. 
B. 
The Trial Court Erroneously Determined that 
Mr. Madsen had No Obligation to Pay Property 
Taxes, Homeowner's Insurance Premiums, and 
Residential Maintenance Costs in the Amount 
of $147 per Month 
Mr. Madsen testified that he was obligated to pay property 
taxes, homeowner's insurance, and home maintenance costs in the 
amount of $147.00 per month. This testimony is further supported 
by the Trust Deed Mr. Madsen had signed in connection with the 
real property. Again, this evidence was undisputed and 
unchallenged. In its Findings of Fact, however, the trial court 
ignored this evidence, sua sponte and without explanation, and 
determined that 
9. Because the Court finds plaintiff's 
mother, Evalyn Madsen, owns the real property 
located at 136 East 1200 South, Bountiful, 
Utah, she has an obligation to pay the 
property taxes of $72.00 per month, the 
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homeowners insurance premium of $25.00 per 
month and the residential maintenance costs 
of $50.00 per month and does not give 
plaintiff credit for these expenses because 
he has no obligation to pay for those 
expenses. 
(R. at 194-95.) While there is conflicting evidence regarding 
the ownership of the home (See Marshalling of Evidence following 
Issue #2), it was undisputed that Mr. Madsen had contractually 
agreed to pay these expenses, just as he had contractually agreed 
to make payments on the loan. The trial court's finding that Mr. 
Madsen had incurred no such obligation is clearly erroneous, as 
it controverts the only evidence before the court on this issue. 
This Court should therefore further reduce the alimony award by 
$147.00 per month to reflect the reduction in Mr. Madsen1s 
ability to pay alimony. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO MRS. 
MADSEN 
A. 
The Court Erred as a Matter of Law in 
Awarding Alimony for 35 Months Without Making 
Any Findings Supporting an Award of that 
Duration 
The trial court was statutorily required to consider the 
length of the parties1 marriage in determining alimony. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1997). This requirement is 
separate and distinct, however, from the prohibition that an 
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award of alimony can generally be for no longer than the length 
of the marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1997). 
By enacting two (2) separate statutory provisions, the 
Legislature intended there to be a cap on the duration of an 
alimony award while also requiring trial courts to make findings 
justifying the duration of an alimony award. The Legislature did 
not intend that the length of the marriage automatically 
determine the duration for an award of alimony. 
In this case, the trial court engaged in no analysis or 
findings to justify an award of alimony for thirty-five (35) 
months except for the fact that thirty-five (35) months is the 
duration of the marriage. Further, the trial judge only 
mentioned the length of the marriage subsequent to awarding 
alimony. In the Findings of Fact, the trial court "orders 
plaintiff to pay alimony to defendant in the sum of $550.00 per 
month for a period of thirty-five (35) months, which was the 
length of the parties1 marriage." (R. at 195.) In the 
Conclusions of Law, the trial court concluded that "the plaintiff 
should be ordered to pay to defendant, as and for alimony, the 
sum of $550.00 per month, for a period of thirty-five months 
after entry of the Decree of Divorce herein, which time period 
equals the length of the parties' marriage." (R. at 199.) 
Moreover, the trial court's Minute Entry ignores the requirement 
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to make findings altogether: "The Court will order the plaintiff 
to pay $550.00 per month for 35 months to the defendant in 
alimony." 
It is clear from the record that the trial court failed to 
analyze how the length of the marriage had any relationship to 
the duration of the alimony award. Absent such analysis or 
Finding of Fact, Mr. Madsen asserts the trial court abused its 
discretion by awarding, carte blanche, alimony for the duration 
of the marriage. Unless this Court's determination of Mr, 
Madsen's ability to pay makes this issue moot, the trial court's 
error in this regard requires that this matter be remanded for 
consideration of the length of the marriage. 
B. 
The Court Awarded Alimony Against Mr. Madsen 
To Punish Him For His "Fault," 
The trial court failed to make sufficient findings as to how 
Mr. Madsen's fault affected Mrs. Madsen's need for alimony. The 
trial court also failed to find how Mr. Madsen's "fault" impacted 
his ability to pay alimony. The trial court simply stated that: 
The Court has considered the issue of fault. 
Based upon the evidence presented of 
plaintiff's problems with domestic violence 
in assaulting defendant and her children, the 
Court finds that plaintiff's problems have 
been a major cause of the break-up of the 
parties' marriage. The Court finds that this 
case is one in which fault should be 
considered when the Court determines whether 
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or not alimony is appropriate. Given the 
fault of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's 
ability to pay alimony and the defendant's 
circumstances involving a lack of reliable 
transportation and her inability to provide 
for herself/ the Court finds that plaintiff 
has the ability to meet some of defendant's 
needs and orders plaintiff to pay alimony to 
defendant in the sum of $550.00 per month for 
a period of thirty-five (35) months, which 
was the length of the parties' marriage. 
(R. at 195.) 
It has long been a tenet of Utah law that alimony is not to 
be used to punish one of the parties. See English v. English, 
565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977) ("The purpose of alimony is to 
provide support for the wife and not to inflict punitive damages 
on the husband. Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the 
husband nor a reward to the wife."); see also Noble v. Noble, 761 
P.2d 1369, 1371-72 (Utah 1988) (husband's tortious shooting of 
wife created need for alimony). 
In this case, the trial court made no findings that Mr. 
Madsen's fault had a direct impact on Mrs. Madsen's need for 
alimony. The inescapable conclusion is that the trial court used 
its award of alimony to punish Mr. Madsen for his "fault." This 
is clearly improper. If the trial court had found that Mr. 
Madsen's fault affected Mrs. Madsen's need for alimony, or 
lengthened the term for which an award might be necessary, then 
the award of alimony might have been properly supported. Here, 
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however, the trial court made no such finding. 
Moreover, that the trial judge intended to punish Mr. Madsen 
can be inferred from his sua sponte reduction as to Mr. Madsen's 
undisputed and unchallenged monthly expenses. Why would the 
trial judge, without explanation, reduce a party's monthly 
expenses unless the intent was to punish that party? The answer 
is clear — the trial judge wanted to, improperly, punish Mr. 
Madsen! Had the trial judge truly believed Mr. Madsen1s 
undisputed and unchallenged expenses were unreasonable, then the 
trial judge could have made express findings supporting the 
unreasonableness of the same. That the trial judge made no 
express findings confirms his intent to improperly punish Mr. 
Madsen. 
C. 
The Court Erred in Determining its Award of 
Alimony Without Considering Restoring Each 
Party to the Condition that Existed at the 
Time of Their Marriage 
When faced with a short-term marriage that has produced no 
children, two (2) separate statutory provisions give the trial 
court the discretion to consider restoring the parties to the 
standard of living they enjoyed at the time of the marriage. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-5(7)(f) and 30-3-5(7)(c) (Supp. 1997). In 
this case, Mr. Madsen1s counsel urged the trial court to do so. 
The parties had been married less than three years, there were no 
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children born as issue of the marriage, and Mrs. Madsen's income 
had increased since the parties were married. 
Although the trial court has discretion to consider (or not 
to consider) restoring Mrs. Madsen to her pre-marital 
circumstances, Mr. Madsen asserts the trial court abused its 
discretion by simply ignoring the issue. The issue was clearly 
argued before the trial court and the parties' circumstances 
completely mirror the situation contemplated by the statutory 
provisions. By not making a finding as to this disputed issue, 
the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, Mr. Madsen 
requests that, unless this issue is mooted by this Court's 
determination of other issues in this case, this matter be 
remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider 
restoring the parties to the position they were in at the time of 
the marriage. 
Ill 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
A. 
The Court Erred in Awarding Attorney's Fees 
without Making Any Findings About the 
Services Performed or the Reasonableness of 
the Fees. 
The trial court's Finding of Fact concerning the amount of 
attorney's fees is limited to the simple statement that "The 
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Court finds the sum of $2,000,00 to be reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs incurred herein." (R. at 196). The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that awarding attorney's fees is a "highly fact-
dependent process." Willey, 333 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11. In doing 
so, the court is required to consider the following factors: 
"'the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number of 
hours spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services, 
the amount involved in the case and the 
result obtained, and the expertise and 
experience of the attorneys involved.1" 
Id. at 11-12 (quoting Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 
(Utah 1996) (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 
1985))). The trial court's findings and conclusions completely 
fail to reflect any analysis of the required factors. 
Moreover, the trial judge in the case at bar had less 
evidence before him than this Court has previously found 
insufficient in Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). In Talley, this Court reversed an award of attorney's 
fees based upon the proffer of counsel. This Court reversed the 
trial judge, even though the proffer included an itemization of 
time and costs for both the attorney and a clerk, as well as 
hourly rates, because the reasonableness of the fees was not 
established. Id. at 84. In contrast, the record herein does not 
reflect any itemization of the fees and costs incurred herein. 
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The trial judge thus made no legitimate finding that the fees 
were reasonable or necessarily incurred. Since defendant failed 
to carry her burden of proof so as to justify a claim for 
attorney's fees, this Court should remand for entry of an order 
directing each party to pay their own fees and costs incurred 
below. 
B. 
The Court Erred in Awarding Legal Fees Based 
on Mr. Madsen's Interest in Real Property 
The trial court's findings on the issue of attorney's fees 
directly conflict with its findings related to another issue. 
The trial court's award of attorney's fees rested on the finding 
that 
"based on plaintiff's legal interest in the 
real property located at 136 East, 1200 
South, Bountiful, Utah, he has equity in said 
real property which defendant does not have 
and the Court therefore finds that plaintiff 
should be ordered to pay attorney's fees on 
behalf of defendant." 
(R. at 196.) This finding is impossible to reconcile with the 
trial court's finding that 
"Because ... plaintiff's mother, Evalyn 
Madsen, owns the real property located at 136 
East, 1200 South, Bountiful, Utah, she has an 
obligation to pay the property taxes of 
$72.00 per month, the homeowners insurance 
premium of $25.00 per month and the 
residential maintenance costs of $50.00 per 
month and [the court] does not give Mr. 
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Madsen credit for the expenses because he has 
no obligation to pay for these expenses." 
(R. at 194-95.) 
Taken together, the trial court appears to have found a 
second way to punish Mr. Madsen for his "fault" in this matter — 
make Mr. Madsen pay attorney's fees by indirectly ordering him to 
borrow against his interest in real property, but refusing to 
permit him to claim the necessary expenses to preserve that 
interest as legitimate monthly expenses. What a "Catch 22!" Mr. 
Madsen has no obligation to preserve real property when it comes 
to analyzing his ability to pay alimony but that same "interest" 
justifies ordering attorney's fees. The logical inconsistency in 
the trial judge's analysis cannot be reconciled without 
concluding that he intended to again improperly punish Mr. 
Madsen. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should remand for an entry of an Order directing 
that Mr. Madsen*s monthly alimony obligation be reduced to 
properly reflect his undisputed and unchallenged monthly 
expenses. This Court should further direct the trial court to 
make sufficient findings to justify the duration of the alimony 
award. Lastly, the parties should be ordered to pay their own 
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attorney's fees and costs incurred. 
Dated this day of , 1998. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(hillip W. Dyer 
Kevin C. Timken 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
R\A:MADSEN.bri/DIV2H 
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ADDENDUM 
211 DIVORCE 30-3-5 
Jd) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or 
court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of^  
icial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases 
e l ^ n t h e decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree af^^^pPGlt 
of n^» |Dondent , upon the petitioner's affidavit. 
(2) Th^^^^^cep t the decree of divorce, may be sealed bv^^^PBTthe court 
upon the moW^Bfeither party. The sealed portion of th^J^peva i l ab le to the 
public only upo^^^ t t i e r of the court. The concernec^^Bes^ the attorneys of 
record or a t t o rne )^^kea notice of appearanc^^Hreact ion, the Office of 
Recovery Services i f l ^ ^ ^ t o the proceedin^^j^^pplied for or is receiving 
public assistance, or the^^^yiave full accfl^^^ne entire record. This sealing 
does not apply to subsequl^Bkngs t o ^ ^ ^ R e or amend the decree. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, S 
1909, ch. 60, S 1; C.L. 1917, § 2999 
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 5 | ^ p f l 9 H 
ch. 59, * 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2 ^ ^ V c h . 116^ 
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, £ 1; 1 £ ^ B T 104, fe 1; 
1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1 9 9 1 ^ B p T 3 5 ; 1992, ch. 
98, $ 1; 1992, ch. 2 9 ( ^ ^ R 9 9 5 , ch. 62, § 1; 
1997, ch. 47, § 2 y ^ H R i . 157, * 1. 
A m e n d m e n ^ ^ K ^ — The 1995 amend-
ment, eftectu^^H^1, 1995, added the second 
sentenc^^^^Bfection (1Kb) and in the second 
sentei^^^KTbsection (l)(d) substituted "shall 
Secree*' for "shall make and file find-
[ decree" and added the language begin-
r
"or, in the case o f at the end. 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 47, effective July 
1997, substituted "petitioner" for "plaintiff" 
"respondent" for "defendant** throughout 
amendment by ch. 157, effective 
May^^^HfejuSubsection (l)(c) deleted "and 
the plainn^^^Bjgd an action in the judicial 
district as dera^^Hfection 78-1-2.1 where the 
pilot program sn^^Hkadministered" after 
"child or children" n^^Mfcfct sentence and 
made stylistic changes. 
This section is set out as r^^^Hfc^>y the 
Office of Legislative Research ^^^^B^eral 
Counsel. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
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incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
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(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify ab'mony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, * 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, * 4; C.L. 1917, * 3000; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, * 3; 
1975, ch. 81, * 1; 1979, ch . 110, $ 1; 1984, ch. 
13, $ 1; 1985, ch . 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, * 1; 
1991, ch. 257, * 4; 1993, ch . 152, * 1; 1993, 
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch . 284, & 1; 1995, ch. 330, 
§ 1; 1997, ch . 232, ^ 4. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, deleted a provision 
from Subsection (3) for support and mainte-
nance orders, deleted former Subsections (5) 
and (6), providing tha t alimony terminates 
upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a mem-
ber of the opposite sex, by the payee, added 
Subsections 7) to (9), renumbered former Sub-
sections (7) and (8) as (5) and (6), and made 
stylistic changes 
The 1997 amendment , effective July 1, 1997 
substituted "Recovery Services" for "Parts 4 
and 5n in Subsection (l)(d) and deleted Subsec-
tion (l)(e) which provided for an assesment 
against the obligor for a check handling fee 
Compiler's Notes . — Laws 1995, ch 330 
which amended this section, provides in ^ 2 
that the Legislature does not intend that ter-
mination of alimony based on cohabitation, in 
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted 
m any way to condone such a relationship for 
any purpose " 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DAMS, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT EUGENE MADSEN, 1 
Pla int i f f , 
VS. 
SHAUNA MARIE BULLOCK 
MADSEN, 
Defendant, 
1 HON. MICHAEL G. ALLPfflN 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Date: July 10, 1997 
Case No. 964702009 DA 
Clerk: K.W. Elmore 
Bailiff: D. Hay good 
VIDEOTAPED 
This matter comes before the Court for a DOMESTIC TRIAL. 
The plaintiff is present and is represented by counsel Phillip W. Dyer. The 
defendant is present and is represented by counsel D. Michael Nielsen. 
Mr. Nielsen makes opening statements. 
Scott E. Madsen is sworn and testifies. 
Plaintiffs exhibit # 2, 1, 7, 6, 4, 5, 3, 14, 9, 10, 12, 11 & 13 are offered and 
received. Plaintiff exhibit # 8 is offered but is rejected. 
Evelyn S. Madsen is sworn and testifies. 
Shauna Madsen is sworn and testifies. 
Defendant's exhibit # 1, 2, & 3 are offered and received. 
Mr. Dyer makes closing statements. He requests the Court to put the parties 
back to where they were before the marriage and not allow alimony to the defendant. 
Mr. Nielsen makes closing statements. He requests the Court to order the 
plaintiff to pay alimony and attorney fees. 
The Court find that it has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter and that 
the plaintiffs testimony has substantially proven the allegations in the divorce complaint. 
The Court grants a divorce based on irreconcilable differences to become final upon entry by 
the judgment clerk. The Court also finds the home belonged to the plaintiffs mother, 
Evelyn S. Madsen, that the plaintiff co-signed the trust deed note with Evelyn Madsen and 
the parties only benefited from the mortgage payment. The Court finds the parties did not 
pay or work more while in the home and the home belongs to Evelyn Madsen and the 
plaintiff has a separate interest in the home. The Court will not award interest in the 
property to the defendant. On the issue of alimony, the Court finds the defendant has 
expenses in the amount of $2760.00 a month which includes the cost of new transportation 
which she will need. The defendant has a net income of $1380.00 a month and the 
defendant has a legal right to child support in the amount of $600.00 a month from her 
previous husband. After that amount, the defendant is still in need of $7S0.00 a month for 
expenses which she does not have. The Court finds the plaintiff has a net income of 
$2911.00 a month plus hockey refereeing of $150.00 a month. The Court finds the plaintiff 
has reasonable expenses in the amount of $2506.00 a month which gives him an excess of 
$550.00 a month. The Court finds it is Evelyn Madsen's responsibility to pay the 
maintenance, property tax and property insurance for the home. The Court finds that fault is 
an issue to the plaintiff. The Court will order the plaintiff to pay $550.00 a month for 35 
months to the defendant in alimony. The plaintiff will be responsible for the $100.00 tax fee 
which was already paid. The plaintiff will also have a judgment for $2,000.00 for the 
defendant's attorney fees. Mr. Dyer will prepare the order. 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
318 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 363-5000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT EUGENE MADSEN, j 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
SHAUNA MARIE BULLOCK MADSEN, 
Defendant. ; 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 96-4702009 DA 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin, District Court Judge presiding, on 
the 10th day of July, 1997, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the 
plaintiff appearing in person with his counsel, Phillip W. Dyer, 
and the defendant appearing in person with her counsel, D. 
Michael Nielsen. Thereupon, the Court having heard the testimony 
presented from witnesses, having considered the exhibits received 
and all evidence before the Court, the parties having been sworn 
and testified, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court now 
makes and enters its 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Pursuant to U.C.A. 30-3-1, et seq., the Court has 
subject matter jurisdiction over the above-entitled matter. 
2. The Court finds that the plaintiff is, and was at all 
times mentioned herein, an actual and bona fide resident of Davis 
County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months prior to 
the filing of the action herein. 
3. The parties are husband and wife having been married on 
or about July 16, 1994, in Bountiful, Utah. 
4. There are no (0) children born as issue of the parties' 
marriage, and none are expected. 
5. The Court finds that there have arisen irreconcilable 
differences between the parties and the plaintiff is therefore 
entitled to a Decree of Divorce, the same to become final upon 
entry. 
6. The Court finds that the real property located at 136 
East 1200 South, Bountiful, Utah, belonged to Evalyn Madsen, 
plaintiff's mother, prior to the parties' marriage, and she owned 
the same free and clear at that time. After the parties' 
marriage, plaintiff co-signed a loan obligation with his mother 
in order that an apartment could be built for plaintiff's mother 
such that plaintiff and defendant would be able to live in 
plaintiff's mother's residence. The Court finds the parties 
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benefitted (at least to the extent of the mortgage payments they 
were paying) due to their possession and enjoyment of the 
property during the marriage• The Court finds that the parties 
did not pay more (nor work more) than what the benefit was to 
them. It was the intent of the parties that the property 
equitably belonged to Evalyn Madsen and the Court so finds. The 
Court finds that plaintiff had an expectation to inherit the real 
property, and after execution of a Quit-claim Deed, a legal joint 
tenancy was created between plaintiff and his mother, Evalyn 
Madsen, such that plaintiff obtained an interest in the property 
as his own separate property. The Court finds that no marital 
interest exists in the residence and defendant is therefore not 
entitled to receive any equity interest from said residence. 
7. The Court finds that defendant has monthly living 
expenses of $2,560.00 and is in need of reliable transportation 
at an expected cost of $200.00 per month. The Court thus finds 
that defendant has monthly living expenses of $2,760.00, which 
includes expenses for her minor children who are not children of 
this marriage. The Court finds that defendant's monthly net 
income is $1,380.00, leaving her with a $1,380.00 per month 
deficiency. The Court finds that defendant has a legal right to 
receive child support from the natural father of her minor 
children in the sum of $600.00 per month. In considering 
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defendant's needs, the Court deducted the child support 
obligation from her monthly deficiency and the defendant's net 
monthly deficiency is $780.00. 
8. The Court finds that plaintiff has a net income of 
$2,911.00 per month from his full-time employment plus $150.00 
per month generated as a hockey referee. The Court finds that 
plaintiff thus has $3,061.00 per month in net income. The Court 
finds that plaintiff's reasonable monthly living expenses are 
$2,506.20, calculated as follows: 
EXPENSE 
Rent 
Food and household 
Utilities 
Telephone 
goods 
Laundry and cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical expense 
Dental expense 
Child support 
Entertainment 
Tithing 
Automobile expense 
Automobile payment 
Installment debt 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT 
$ 
$2" 
557, 
350 
100, 
30, 
25, 
50. 
25. 
25, 
433. 
75. 
361. 
150. 
85. 
240. 
r506. 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.20 
.00 
,00 
,00 
,00 
.00 
,20 
9. Because the Court finds plaintiff's mother, Evalyn 
Madsen, owns the real property located at 136 East 1200 South, 
Bountiful, Utah, she has an obligation to pay the property taxes 
of $72.00 per month, the homeowners insurance premium of $25.00 
per month and the residential maintenance costs of $50.00 per 
4 
month and does not give plaintiff credit for these expenses 
because he has no obligation to pay for those expenses• Based on 
the Court's finding concerning plaintiff's expenses, plaintiff 
has $555.00 available to him beyond his living expenses. 
10. The Court has considered the issue of fault. Based 
upon the evidence presented of plaintiff's problems with domestic 
violence in assaulting defendant and her children, the Court 
finds that plaintiff's problems have been a major cause of the 
break-up of the parties' marriage, The Court finds that this 
case is one in which fault should be considered when the Court 
considers whether or not alimony is appropriate. Given the fault 
of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's ability to pay alimony and the 
defendant's circumstances involving a lack of reliable 
transportation and her inability to provide for herself, the 
Court finds that plaintiff has the ability to meet some of 
defendant's needs and orders plaintiff to pay alimony to 
defendant in the sum of $550.00 per month for a period of thirty-
five (35) months, which was the length of the parties' marriage. 
The plaintiff's obligation to pay alimony automatically 
terminates at the end of the thirty-five (35) month period 
herein. Further, said alimony shall also terminate in the event 
defendant remarries or cohabitates with another person prior to 
the expiration of the thirty-five (35) month period herein. 
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11. Based upon plaintiff's ability to pay and plaintiff's 
actual payment of the same, the Court finds that plaintiff should 
be ordered to pay the tax fees incurred in the sum of $100.00. 
12. The Court finds that defendant cannot pay her 
attorney's fees in this case but plaintiff's ability to pay 
attorney's fees is also limited due to his income and the alimony 
obligation ordered herein. However, based on plaintiff's legal 
interest in the real property located at 136 East 1200 South, 
Bountiful, Utah, he has access to equity in said real property 
which defendant does not have and the Court therefore finds that 
plaintiff should be ordered to pay attorney's fees on behalf of 
defendant. The Courts finds the sum of $2,000.00 to be 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred herein. Judgment 
shall be entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff in 
the sum of $2,000.00. 
13. The Court finds that there are no medical or 
counselling expenses currently outstanding. In the event that 
medical or counselling expenses arise in the future, the Court 
finds that defendant can file a lawsuit for such sums. 
14. The Court finds the parties have agreed that each of 
the parties should be awarded, free and clear of any claim of the 
other, their respective retirement account(s) and all other 
personal property in their respective possession. 
6 
WHEREFORE, the Court having made its Findings of Fact, now 
makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the subject matter jurisdiction 
and grounds for divorce requirements of U.C.A. 30-3-1, et seq., 
have been met such that plaintiff shall be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, dissolving 
the bonds of matrimony from the defendant, the same to become 
final upon entry. 
2. The Court concludes that no marital interest exists in 
the real property and residence located at 136 East 1200 South, 
Bountiful, Utah, and defendant should not be awarded any interest 
in or to said real property and residence. 
3. The Court concludes that defendant has monthly living 
expenses of $2,560.00 and is in need of reliable transportation 
at an expected cost of $200.00 per month. The Court concludes 
that defendant has monthly living expenses of $2,7 60.00, which 
includes expenses for her minor children who are not children of 
this marriage. The Court concludes that defendant's monthly net 
income is $1,380.00, leaving her with a $1,380.00 per month 
deficiency. The Court also concludes that defendant has a legal 
right to receive child support from the natural father of her 
minor children in the sum of $600.00 per month. In considering 
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defendant's needs, the Court deducted the child support 
obligation from her monthly deficiency. The Court concludes that 
defendant's net monthly deficiency is thus $780.00. 
4. The Court concludes that plaintiff has a net income of 
$2/911.00 per month from his full-time employment plus $150.00 
per month generated as a hockey referee. The Court concludes 
that plaintiff thus has $3,061.00 per month in net income. The 
Court concludes that plaintiff's reasonable monthly living 
expenses are $2,506.20. The Court concludes that plaintiff has 
income available to him beyond his living expenses in the sum of 
$555.00 per month. 
5. The Court concludes that plaintiff should not be given 
credit for the property taxes of $72.00 per month, the homeowners 
insurance premium of $25.00 per month and the residential 
maintenance costs of $50.00 per month, which are the sole 
obligation of Evalyn Madsen to pay and for which plaintiff has no 
obligation to pay. 
6. The Court concludes that the issue of fault should be 
considered when the Court considers whether or not alimony is 
appropriate in this case. 
7. The Court concludes that plaintiff has the ability to 
pay alimony in the sum of $550.00 per month. 
8. The Court concludes that defendant is in need of alimony 
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in, at least, the sum of $550.00 per month. 
9. The Court concludes that the plaintiff should be ordered 
to pay to defendant, as and for alimony, the sum of $550.00 per 
month, for a period of thirty-five (35) months after entry of the 
Decree of Divorce herein, which time period equals the length of 
the parties' marriage. The plaintiff's obligation to pay 
alimony automatically terminates at the end of the thirty-five 
(35) month period herein. Further, said alimony shall also 
terminate in the event defendant remarries or cohabitates with 
another person prior to the expiration of the thirty-five (35) 
month period herein. 
10. The Court concludes that plaintiff should be ordered to 
pay the tax fees incurred in the sum of $100.00. 
11. The Court concludes that plaintiff should be ordered to 
pay defendant's attorney's fees. The Court further concludes 
that the sum of $2,000.00 constitutes reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs incurred herein and judgment should be entered in favor 
of defendant and against plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.00 for 
the same. 
12. Based on their agreement, the Court concludes that each 
of the parties should be awarded, free and clear of any claim of 
the other, their respective retirement account(s) and all other 
9 
personal property in their respective possession. 
MADE AND ENTERED this g^^^dav of -/£^T 1997 
BY THE COURT: 
Pbg/h.idj«n.fla/DIVII 
M145.00 
H0N6RABLE ftl 
District Court 
. ALLPHIN 
ge 
Approved as to form:/ 
Attorney for Defendant 
lO/ss/qr) 
Date 
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PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
318 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 363-5000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT EUGENE MADSEN, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
SHAUNA MARIE BULLOCK MADSEN, ] 
Defendant. ] 
I DECREE OF DIVORCE 
i Civil No. 96-4702009 DA 
i Judge Michael G. Allphin 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin, District Court Judge presiding, on 
the 10th day of July, 1997, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the 
plaintiff appearing in person with his counsel, Phillip W. Dyer, 
and the defendant appearing in person with her counsel, D. 
Michael Nielsen. Thereupon, the Court having heard the testimony 
presented from witnesses, having considered the exhibits received 
and all evidence before the Court, the parties having been sworn 
and testified, the Court having made and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefore, 
1 
Y _.&cL 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The plaintiff be, and is hereby, awarded a Decree of 
Divorce, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, dissolving 
the bonds of matrimony from defendant, the same to become final 
upon entry. 
2. The defendant is not awarded any equitable interest in 
or to the real property and residence located at 136 East 1200 
South, Bountiful, Utah. 
3. The plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to defendant in 
the sum of $550.00 per month for a period of thirty-five (35) 
months after entry of the Decree of Divorce herein at which time 
plaintiff's alimony obligation shall automatically terminate. 
Said alimony shall also terminate in the event that defendant 
remarries or cohabitates with another person prior to the 
expiration of the thirty-five (35) month period herein. 
4. The Court orders plaintiff to pay the tax fees incurred 
in the sum of $100.00. 
5. The Court orders plaintiff to pay the sum of $2,000.00 
as and for defendant's attorney's fees. Judgment shall be 
entered in favor defendant and against plaintiff in the sum of 
$2,000.00 as and for the same. 
6. The Court determines that there are no medical or 
counselling expenses currently outstanding. In the event that 
2 
medical or counselling expenses arise in the future, the Court 
orders that defendant can file a lawsuit for such sums. 
7. The parties are each awarded, free and clear of any 
claim of the other party, their respective retirement account(s) 
and all other personal property in their respective possession. 
DATED this ^ i ^ d a y of (lOT . 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
JORABLE MICHAE&/G. ALLPHIN 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
^A^torney for Defendant 
Date 
Pbg/Mads.n.dac/DIV" 
M1A5.00 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Phillip W. Dyer, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he served BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT SCOTT EUGENE 
MADSEN upon the following parties by placing four (4) true 
and correct copies thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
D. Michael Nielsen, Esq. 
Session Place 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
and mailing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
the day of ., 1998. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
i; 1998, 
Jbr.ftj.U*^.
 fk\/'drju^^ 
My Commission expires: 
Notary Public 
R e s i d i n g a t : i 
S ^ l t Lake Coun ty , Utah 
NOTARY PUBLld: 
Kathleen J. Gliiiaa* 
138 So. Main St„ No, 316 
Ult Uko City, Utah 84101 
My Commission Expire 
December 23,1990 
STATE OF UTAH J 
